Effects of controllable process factors on Al rear surface bumps in Si solar cells

High efficiency solar cells require good back surface field passivation and high back reflectance in the rear Al region. In module processes, wafer-based solar cell can break through stress during soldering uneven rear aluminum surfaces - a serious problem that affects throughput. This work examined rear surfaces with respect to controllable process factors such as ramping and cooling rates during rapid thermal processing, and the fineness of aluminum powder used in the screen-printed paste. A faster ramp up rate resulted in a uniform temperature gradient between the aluminum and silicon surfaces. As a results, the bumps on the aluminum surface were small and of high density. Fine aluminum metal powder in the paste for screen-printing contact points resulted in large distribution, high density bumps. Bumps formed during cooling in metallization, their sizes and densities were dependent the on uniformity of the aluminum and silicon liquid wetting of the silicon surface.     

一种时序逻辑网络的快速设计方法

引用1984年尹克震提出的“开关函数的反演公式”,采用伪随机序列技术的思想,提出移位寄存器型时序逻辑网络的一种快速设计方法。     

Computer simulation of back sputtering and ion penetration into polycrystalline targets

Pramana - In the present work computer simultations of the back sputtering of low energy neon ions with low impact parameter and the penetration of the same for higher values of the impact...     

部分耗尽SOI MOSFET总剂量效应与偏置状态的关系

实验表明SOI MOSFET掩埋氧化层中的总剂量辐射效应与辐射过程中的偏置状态有关. 对诱发背沟道泄漏电流的陷阱电荷进行了研究. 建立一个数值模型来模拟不同偏置下陷进电荷的建立, 它包括辐射产生的载流子复合和俘获的过程. 模拟结果与实验结果相符, 解释了总剂量辐射效应受偏置状态影响的机理.     

手机广告链中移动运营商的努力动机研究与仿真

建立了由单手机广告主、手机广告代理商和移动运营商构成的三级广告产业链之间的基于协作的收益共享契约模型,分析了在以移动运营商为主导的手机广告链中,移动运营商的努力动机受收益共享和努力成本补偿参数的影响.采用量化分析和模拟仿真结合的方法,得出契约参数只有在满足一定条件下,移动运营商所做出的最优努力水平投入决策,将使得整个手机产业链收益最大化,实现多方共赢.     

一类客户预订商品的最优契约设计模型

在假设厂商不会违约的前提下,建立了预订商品最优契约设计模型,讨论了定金优化选择问题.模型指出最优的定金ω-恰是厂商所售产品的利润,而主合同中规定客户购买该产品续交的资金ω恰为产品的成本c.最后指出,厂商向客户提供预订服务能够增加交易的总剩余,提高市场交易的福利.     

防范道德风险的博弈分析和契约设计

运用不完全信息动态博弈的理论，建立了一个防范道德风险的博弈模型．给出了该博弈的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡．在此基础上给出了基于最优博弈策略的契约的具体形式。而这种基于博弈论的契约可以克服有成本的状态验证模型(CSV)及经典激励理论中承诺的可信性问题。     

Manufacturer’s revenue-sharing contract and retail competition

This paper investigates a revenue-sharing contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, offers a revenue-sharing contract to two competing retailers who face stochastic demand before the selling season. Under the offered contract terms, the competing retailers are to determine the quantities to be ordered from the manufacturer, prior to the season, and the retail price at which to sell the items during the season. The process of pricing and ordering is expected to result in an equilibrium as in the Bayesian Nash game. On the basis of anticipated responses and actions of the retailers, the manufacturer designs the revenue-sharing contract. Adopting the classic newsvendor problem model framework and using numerical methods, the study finds that the provision of revenue-sharing in the contract can obtain better performance than a price-only contract. However, the benefits earned under the revenue-sharing contract by different supply chain partners differ because of the impact of demand variability and price-sensitivity factors. The paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on decisions about optimal retail price, order quantity and profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailers. Lastly, it investigates how the competition (between retailers) factor influences the decision-making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability.